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THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT
AND WHISTLEBLOWERS-HOW MACLEAN AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT SENT NATIONAL SECURITY
INTO A NOSE DIVE
CASSIE SUTTLE*

yET AGAIN, a federal court chips away at already eroding national security protections in the name of an individual. The
Federal Circuit's decision in MacLean v. Department of Homeland
Security exemplifies the current attitude toward measures taken
to ensure national safety: aloof at its slightest and combative at
its worst. As the United States drifts further from the overcautious approach that swept the nation after September 11, 2001,
it is essential that the country does not fall back into the lackadaisical attitude of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the
Federal Circuit's decision in MacLean is a step in the wrong
direction.
MacLean involves the all-too-familiar story of a citizen leaking
classified information under the guise of benevolence.' However, in a unique twist, the rogue American involved in the case
was a federal air marshal,' and the impact of his disclosures on
public safety could be catastrophic.' In July 2003, Robert J.
MacLean and his fellow air marshals "received a briefing from
the [Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ] that there
was a 'potential plot' to hijack U.S. [a]irliners."5 Following the
briefing, the TSA informed the marshals via text message that it
was "cancelling all missions on flights from Las Vegas [, Nevada,]
* Cassie Suttle is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2015, at SMU Dedman
School of Law. She received her B.A. in Psychology and Government from The
University of Texas at Austin. Cassie would like to thank her amazing parents,
sisters, and Corey Russell for their unwavering love and support.
I 714 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
2 See id. at 1304-05.
3 Id. at 1304.
4 See id. at 1306-07.
5 Id. at 1304.
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until early August."6 Although the text message was not initially
labeled as "sensitive security information" (SSI), the TSA later
issued an order stating that the content was in fact SSI. 7
MacLean allegedly became wary that the "suspension of overnight missions during a hijacking alert created a danger to the
flying public."" He protested to both his supervisor and the Office of Inspector General to no avail.9 MacLean's next step was
to contact MSNBC, which published a detailed article condemning the directive.'o Through the article, congressional members
became informed of the TSA's directive." Under substantial
pressure by these congressional members, the TSA was forced to
withdraw its decree.' 2 In 2004, the TSA uncovered MacLean's
disclosure after he appeared in disguise on NBC Nightly News to
criticize air marshal dress code.' 3 The TSA terminated MacLean
shortly thereafter, reasoning that his actions "constituted an unauthorized disclosure of . . . SSI.""
The legal battle that ensued is almost as convoluted as the
FAA regulations themselves. MacLean first challenged the SSI
order in front of the Ninth Circuit, arguing that it was a violation of TSA regulations and an "impermissible retroactive
agency action."" The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the text message was SSI under applicable regulations and that the TSA's actions were not retroactive.1 6 Next,
MacLean challenged his removal by the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), arguing that his actions constituted protected whistleblowing pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Act (WPA)."1 The Board disagreed, holding that the TSA regulaId.
7 Id.
8 Id.
6

9 Id.
10 Id.; see Ono, Budget Cuts in Air MarshalProgram:MSNBC, COLLAPSING TEMPORAL PLATES-A WEB OF DELUSION (July 30, 2003, 7:43 AM), http://onoekeh.blogspot.com/2003/07/budget-cuts-in-air-marshall.html.
11 See MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1304.
12 See id.; James Gordon Meek, Team Bush Scrubs Plan to Cut Air Marshal
Force,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 31, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
archives/news/team-bush-scrubs-plan-cut-air-marshal-force-article-1.516198.
13 MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1304.
14

Id.

15 MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.
2008).
16 Id.

17 See MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 4, 11 20, 21 (2009).
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tions specifically prohibited MacLean's disclosure. 8 On appeal,
the Board again rejected MacLean's arguments, this time asserting that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
directly prohibited his disclosure."
The Federal Circuit subsequently took up the case. In
MacLean, the court easily found that (1) the TSA was authorized
to remove MacLean as a result of his disclosure, 0 (2) the removal was not a disparate penalty, 2' and (3) MacLean was not
discriminated against. 22 Nevertheless, the court reversed the decision on a technicality.23 The dispositive issue turned on the
proper interpretation of both the ATSA and the WPA.2 1 Specifically, the court set out to establish whether MacLean's disclosure was prohibited by law within the meaning of the WPA.
The WPA prohibits authoritative figures from taking "personnel action" against a government employee "because of ... any
disclosure of information ... which the employee ... reasonably

believes evidences ... a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety . .. if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by
law."2 6 Two judges of the court held that because a TSA regulation barred MacLean's disclosure, his "whistleblowing" activity
was not "specifically prohibited by law."2 According to the
judges, regulations were not the type of law that could prohibit
whistleblower protection under the WPA. 28 A third judge concurred, agreeing with the overall outcome but taking the opinion one step further by stating that MacLean's disclosure was
reasonable.2 9
The court found it inconsequential that an express legislative
directive, the ATSA, called for TSA regulations barring disclo18Id. 11 22-33.
19 MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.P.R. 562, 117 (2011); Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 603 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
20 See MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
21 See id. at 1307.
22 Id.
23 See

id. at 1310.
See id. at 1308-11.
25 See id. at 1308.
26 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8) (2012) (emphasis added).
27 See MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1310.
28 Id. at 1309.
29 See id. at 1311 (Wallach, J., concurring) (noting that "the facts alleged, if
proven, allege conduct at the core of the Whistleblower Protection Act").
24
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sure of SSI." The ATSA states, in part, "[T]he Secretary of
Transportation shall prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of information . . . if the Secretary of Transportation de-

cides [that] disclosing the information would ... be detrimental
to transportation safety."" Even though the case was a "very
close" one, the justices held that the ATSA's express legislative
directive was insufficiently specific and therefore "not enough to
push the [statute] over th [e WPA's specificity] threshold.""
The Federal Circuit erred in concluding that the ATSA does
not specifically prohibit SSI disclosure for two reasons: (1) regulations stemming from express legislative directives have the
same force of law as general statutes, and (2) the court's rationale strips the TSA regulation of its enforcement power and
thereby thwarts the underlying purpose of the ATSA. The Federal Circuit's whimsical response to a potentially serious national security breach demands congressional action to close
gaps in the WPA.
First, the court's differentiation between regulations arising
from express legislative directives and statutes for WPA purposes
was erroneous." Admittedly, the WPA provides a defense to federal employees who disclose information so long as the disclosure is reasonable and a statute does not specifically prohibit the
disclosure.3 Here, however, a statute specifically prohibited disclosure." Congress, through the ATSA, directed the TSA to promulgate rules prohibiting disclosure," and the TSA comported
with the express directive. When Congress directs an agency to
make law on its behalf, it should have the same force of law as
statutes themselves.3 8 Administrative law is not an agency
rulemaking free-for-all." While agencies do enjoy a certain
amount of discretionary power, legislative directives severely
3o

See id. at 1310 (majority opinion).

31
32

49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (1) (2006).
MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1310.

3

See id.

3

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8) (2012).
See 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (1); 49 C.F.R. § 1520.9 (2008) ("A covered person

3

must . .. [d]isclose, or otherwise provide access to, SSI only to covered persons
who have a need to know, unless otherwise authorized .
36 See 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (1).
3

See 49 C.F.R. § 15209.

See 2 Am. JUR. 2D Administrative § 133 (2013).
See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. RFv. 1669, 1670 (1975).
38
3
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constrain administrative action.4 0 Traditionally, agencies are required to act only within boundaries specified by a legislative
directive. 4 ' These legislative directives are essentially a call for
backup when Congress lacks sufficient resources and knowledge
to draft a statute.4 2 Indeed, the whole purpose of administrative
agencies' rulemaking authority is to add an extra layer of expertise that Congress is unable to provide.
That being said, it makes sense for Congress to delegate
rulemaking authority to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS); Congress created the agency just eleven days after the
September 11th terrorist attacks for the chief purpose of shielding the United States from threats.4 4 The DHS has boundless
expertise on arguably the United States' most important priority-national security." A Congress that lacked the expertise,
knowledge, and foresight to determine what kind of sensitive
information required utmost security directed the TSA, a subagency of the DHS, to promulgate the laws in question.4 6 The
Federal Circuit's failure to acknowledge that these TSA regulations in essence supplant the ATSA's directive is scary
precedent.
40 See id. at 1669-70; Administrative, supra note 38, § 132.
41 See Stewart, supra note 39, at 1670.
42 See id. at 1678; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, . . . rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments."). Types
of Administrative Agency Action: Rulemaking, Adjudication, Investigation, USLEGAL,
INC., http://administrativelaw.uslegal.com/three-types-of-administrative-agencyaction-rulemaking-adjudication-investigation/
(last visited May 22, 2014)
("[L]egislatures frequently find areas where it is impractical ... to apply a level of
detail or expertise required to constitute complete standards.") [hereinafter
Types of Administrative Agency Action].
43 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 865 (stating that agencies are entitled to
deference because regulatory schemes are often "technical and complex," and
agencies boast a more tailored expertise); Types of Administrative Agency Action,
supra note 42.
44 Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited May 22,
2014) (The DHS "coordinate[s] a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard
the country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks.").
45 See Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://
www.dhs.gov/prevent-terrorism-and-enhance-security (last visited May 22, 2014)
("Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is our founding principle and our highest priority.").
46 See 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (1) (2006); Who joined DHS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs (last visited May 22, 2014).
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Based on the Federal Circuit rationale, it follows that Congress had two alternatives if it wanted to avoid the WPA thwarting the entire purpose of its ATSA disclosure directive: (1)
adopt its own statute prohibiting federal air marshals' disclosure
of SSI, or (2) adopt the TSA's regulations regarding disclosure
of SSI as law.4 7 Not only are these alternatives incredibly inefficient, but they are also nonsensical. Such alternatives would require Congress to either draft a resolution adopting the TSA
regulations or craft a statute on its own, both of which would
unreasonably cost time and resources. Inefficiency with respect
to national security is inexcusable." Moreover, as aforementioned, the purpose of agencies like the DHS is to add expertise
lacking in Congress.4 ' The Federal Circuit's precedent eviscerates Congress's attempt to craft more comprehensive national
security measures. This is hardly the type of action Americans
should want to encourage.
Not only does the Federal Circuit's rationale offend administrative law theory, but it also takes the teeth out of the ATSA and
impedes its underlying purpose. The court's rationale effectively
renders the TSA's disclosure regulations moot by providing a
defense under the WPA to defecting federal air marshals.o By
these standards, one would be hard pressed to formulate a scenario under which a federal air marshal would not be saved by
the protections of the WPA after disclosing SSI.6' Sure, a jury
would still have to decide whether said air marshal "reasonably
believed" that the SSI evidenced a specific and significant danger to public safety. 2 But a rogue air marshal may be willing to
take that gamble if there is a chance that he will keep his job.
The Federal Circuit's interpretation completely frustrates the
underlying purpose of the ATSA. Congress promulgated the
ATSA in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
exclusively to strengthen the security of the United States' trans47 See MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
48 See Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security, supra note 45.
49 See Types of AdministrativeAgency Action, supra note 42; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (An agency may
"resolv[e] the competing interests which Congress ... inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.").
50 See MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1310.
51 See id. at 1308-10.
52 See id. at 1311; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8) (2012).
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portation infrastructure.5 3 Hence, Congress must forbid the disclosure of this extremely sensitive information in order to
implement this policy. Punishment for rogue offenders must be
swift, not nonexistent.54 It is essential that federal air marshals
keep classified information in confidence, regardless of the information provided. As the United States has painfully learned,
sensitive information in the wrong hands can lead to devastating
and deadly consequences.5 5 Even if MacLean innocently assumed that the directive could negatively affect the public, he
did not have the information to know with certainty. Air marshals are not always given background information for measures
they are asked to implement.56 In fact, agency heads, including
the head of the TSA, are responsible for designating which
subordinate government employees have access to sensitive national security information.5 7 As a result, the reasons underlying
the implementation of certain directives are often kept confidential from subordinates.
Disclosure of SSI, regardless of an official's subjective beliefs,
should be strictly forbidden pursuant to the ATSA. In holding
otherwise, the Federal Circuit effectively prioritized the WPA
over the ATSA, which is chilling precedent. The WPA is meant
to protect a government employee who blows the whistle on
agency misconduct,59 not to protect one who disagrees with a
53 Marcia B. Dinneen, Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, IMMIGR.
AM. (June 24, 2011), http://immigrationinamerica.org/371-aviation-and-transportation-security-act-of-2001.html.
54 Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 83 No. 2 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 285-86 (2002)
(discussing the retributive and deterrent effects of punishing wrongdoers).
55 See Press Release, Louis J. Freeh, FBI Dir., Robert Philip Hanssen Espionage
Case (Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famouscases/robert-hanssen (Robert Phillip Hanssen was an FBI agent who intentionally
exposed two American spies to the Soviet Union, resulting in their execution);
Raphael G. Satter, WikiLeaks: Breach Has Exposed Unredacted U.S. Cables, HuwFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
08/31/wikileaks-breach-has-expo-n_944299.html (anti-secrecy group Wikileaks
released sensitive, unredacted documents which "contain [ed] the names of individuals whose lives are at risk because they are named").
56 See Blake Morrison, Air Marshals ChargeNew Policies Could EndangerPassengers,
USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2002, 11:17 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2002-12-18-air-marshal-coverx.htm (suggesting that it is common for
superiors to "lie[ ] to" subordinate air marshals).
57 Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 708 (Dec. 29, 2009).
58 See Morrison, supra note 56.
59 L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33918, THE WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION ACT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2007).
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national security directive. Congress ordered its top transportation security agency to create nondisclosure regulations,6 0 and
the court practically prohibited the agency from enforcing these
regulations by giving scallywag employees an out under the
WPA.6 ' The ATSA's policy to uphold the safety and security of
the United States should be treated as just as important as, if not
more important than, an air marshal's right to protest a directive. To hold otherwise would invite further disclosures under
the pretense of altruism and would force the agency to lose faith
in its employees. Should we really be willing to take that gamble
with national security?
In sum, the Federal Circuit's misguided opinion calls for congressional action. MacLean flies in the face of an agency's
rulemaking authority and thwarts the policy behind an act specifically crafted to secure our nation from potential future
threats. Congress must take the necessary steps to restore the
TSA's authority to punish an individual who discloses sensitive
security information and thereby breaches national security.
Moreover, an agency dedicated to protecting our country from
threats must have full faith in its employees. We cannot expect
the TSA to have faith in its employees if it is forced to keep
rogue employees on its payroll. MacLean had several alternatives to voice his displeasure with the directive he assumed was a
public safety hazard rather than going to the media. The Federal Circuit should not have excused MacLean's failure to take
advantage of all options due to a technicality in the law. National security is of utmost importance to the public, the DHS,
and the TSA-the Federal Circuit should take note.
6o
61

See 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (1) (2006).
See MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

